Home page > Thinking Federalist > The Commission any federalist should want

Opposite Perspectives

The Commission
any federalist should want

, by Jon Worth

All the versions of this article: [English] [français]

Since the days of Delors leading a strong Commission, the EU’s executive has been far from vibrant. As the EU has enlarged, so too has the number of Commissioners. Today we have the somewhat absurd situation with Commission portfolios as miniscule as multilingualism. This clearly has to change. Commission Vice President Günter Verheugen stated that small states should simply content themselves with being allocated minor portfolios, but what should the federalist response to this be?

authors

Let us start by discussing the very basic role of each of the institutions. It is the job of the Council to represent the interests of the states. The European Parliament is there to represent the people. The European Commissionthe executive branch – should hence be tasked with carrying out the instructions of the other institutions, and should be accountable to both of them. This should be the dominant rationale when talking about the future of the European Commission from a federalist perspective.

The Commission is not there to represent national interests; it should be the executive acting in the European interest.

So how should the composition of the European Commission look?

As a starting point, the current status quo must be resoundingly rejected: the Commission currently contains one member for each Member State, but this is indefensible for two reasons: firstly, because the European Commission is not meant to reflect states’ interests, and secondly, as the EU enlarges so the Commission becomes large and unwieldy with insufficient portfolios to share around.

The construction of a system to replace the current one must start with the Commission President. As federalists have long argued, the selection of the head of the Commission must be dependent on the outcome of the European Parliament elections – i.e. he or she must come from the largest fraction in the Parliament.

It must then be the task of the Commission President to allocate portfolios to Commissioners, on the basis of candidates nominated from the European Parliament and the Member States. The total number of portfolios should be determined according to the policy areas that the EU is engaged in, not according to the number of Member States. Nationality requirements should be in place so as to prevent the domination of the Commission by nationals of one Member State; the stipulation of no more than 2 Commissioners of the same nationality would meet that requirement. In addition the means of control from the European Parliament over the Commission would need to be radically improved, with the opportunity for the European Parliament to sanction the removal from office of individual Commissioners.

So what would this mean in practice?

The Commission would be more accountable to the European Parliament, would be more party political, more responsive to citizens concerns, and would better start to resemble a government.

It’s inconceivable in practice that the Commission would not contain a German (or even a British or French) national, but by vesting the power in the Commission President to choose Commissioners, the chance that a competent team could be chosen would be improved.

So this is – in short – what federalists should be asking for.

But what might we get in the short- to medium-term? In purely practical terms a smaller Commission is vital for the sake of efficiency of working.

The federalist demands in this context should be three-fold. Firstly, any immediate reform must not introduce additional or arbitrary nationality requirements (such as the 2/3 rotation idea). Secondly, the general competence of the Commissioners should be stressed, and deputy / lesser portfolios for Commissioners from smaller Member States should be rejected as a result – a competent Commissioner from a small member state is better than a loose cannon from the largest member state. Thirdly, the accountability link between Parliament and Commission should be strengthened, especially in the run-up to the 2009 European elections.

See online : Read the Opposite Perspective here.

Share this article

P.S.

Image:

- The 10 new European Commissioners with Commission President Prodi in 2004, source: Google Images

This article was originally published in the spring edition of The New Federalist, paper version of the magazine of the Young European Federalists (JEF-Europe).

Reply to this article

pre-moderation

Warning, your message will only be displayed after it has been checked and approved.

Who are you?

To show your avatar with your message, register it first on gravatar.com (free et painless) and don’t forget to indicate your Email addresse here.

Enter your comment here
  • This form accepts SPIP shortcuts [->urls] {{bold}} {italics} <quotes> <code> and HTML code <q> <del> <ins>. To create paragraphs, just leave empty lines.

Follow the comments: RSS 2.0 | Atom