72 days after the German election, the German Bundestag voted for Friedrich Merz as a new chancellor. But his start wasn’t smooth, as he failed in the first round of election which had never happened to a designated chancellor in German history before. That’s one of the reasons why Merz is increasingly seen as weak in Germany — in contrast to the international stage where strength and resilience is expected.
But what can Europe really expect from him? From a man who wanted to be chancellor more than 20 years ago but has never held a government position? He doesn’t have much time to settle in, in the very dynamic geopolitical landscape, and the decisions a German chancellor must make are crucial. How is Germany viewed by France, Poland and Ukraine?
The constitutional amendment to reform the debt brake appeared rushed, pushed through by the outgoing parliament even though a new one had already been elected. The debt brake, introduced in 2009 in response to the global financial crisis, is a fiscal rule enshrined in Germany’s constitution that limits the federal government’s structural deficit. Its purpose is to ensure long-term fiscal stability and prevent excessive government debt. During the campaign, Merz repeatedly stated that there would be no changes to the debt brake under his leadership as chancellor. Yet immediately after the election, the law was amended. Without this move, however, the incoming government of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) would likely have struggled to implement key projects — from expanding infrastructure to steering Germany’s economy out of recession.
At the same time, the Bundeswehr (German military) is set to receive stronger support. The debt brake, originally meant to limit public spending, will be effectively lifted up for defense and security. In a world where Russia continues to assault on Ukraine and the United States under President Trump can no longer be considered a reliable ally, Germany is preparing for all eventualities and is determined to strengthen its in Europe.
Merz and Macron new best buddies?
Three days after Merz’s political party won the federal election, he was on his way to Paris, as well as on his first day as a chancellor. This move can be seen as a clear signal that Merz wants to make key differences in foreign and security policy. Olaf Scholz did not strongly advocate for a close political partnership between France and Germany. “The Franco-German friendship has remained intact on many levels in recent years — just not at the highest political level, between the Chancellor and the President, and consequently not between the two governments either”, said Jacob Ross, Research Fellow for Franco-German Relations at the German Council on Foreign Relations.
Looking back to the era of Angela Merkel, many pictures show warm gestures like handshakes and greeting kisses with Macron, but policy alignment wasn’t always consistent. Ross explains that Merkel didn’t fully engage with Macron’s proposals for advancing European integration, especially in security and defence. Merz, on the other hand, intends to make these aspects a priority.
“The expectations for Friedrich Merz in Paris are enormous”
Despite France and Germany being the largest EU members, their size isn’t the main focus when analysing their EU roles, noted Stefan Seidendorf, current managing director at the German-French Institute. “The two countries are the most different, they initially disagree on all the points they can think of: Nuclear energy, nuclear phase-out, debt policy.”
When both countries agree on an issue, they exert significant influence over the other member states. This could result in a resolution in which Eastern European countries cooperate with one another and claim that they are being dominated by Germany and France, explained Seidendorf. To him is the Weimar Triangle a potential solution: “Overall, it is hoped that Germany will take a more European stance, that it will position itself on European issues and develop these itself.” His criticism targets Germany’s decisions, such as the recent vote on new debt, which he argued are always too nationally oriented rather than developed within a European context. Ross also sees a need for change in the German-French political partnership, but it won’t be easy: „The expectations for Friedrich Merz in Paris are so high that they are likely to lead to disappointment.“
Scholz in office, German-Polish relations in decline
Olaf Scholz’s tenure as Chancellor of Germany will be remembered in Poland as a period of tense bilateral relations. The international circumstances were far from favourable, with the differences emerging in the context of the war in Ukraine. Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, launched only two months after Scholz’s appointment, Poland criticized Germany’s initially slow response regarding help for Ukraine. The conclusion of Scholz’s tenure will not be fondly remembered either. In October 2024, both Poland and Ukraine were excluded from international discussions held in Berlin concerning the war in Ukraine. The dissatisfaction over this issue was intensified by an incident during a summit of EU member state leaders in December 2024, when Scholz reportedly shouted at Polish President Andrzej Duda in response to his proposal to redistribute frozen Russian assets. This reaction attracted criticism in Poland, not only due to Poland’s aspirations as a respected actor on NATO’s eastern flank, but also because of the declared role as a representative of Ukraine’s and other regional countries’ interests during international talks.
German-Polish relations under Friedrich Merz’s governance
That is why Poland is observing the change of power in Germany with such great interest – in hope for a positive shift. Early signs may appear promising: speaking at an event hosted by the Körber Foundation in Berlin, Friedrich Merz emphasized that the political silence between Berlin and Warsaw must come to an end. Merz also suggested drafting a new German-Polish Treaty of Friendship, ideally to be signed in 2026 to mark the 35th anniversary of the original Treaty of Good Neighbourship.
The question remains to what extent these declarations will be translated into concrete actions. The German coalition agreement reflects some of Merz’s statements, in which it underscores the importance of revitalising the Weimar Triangle and includes plans for cross-border infrastructure development, especially in the railway sector. Some commemorative initiatives are also mentioned, including the creation of a monument for Polish victims of Nazi Germany and the establishment of the German-Polish House.
While the initial proposals are laudable on paper, their implementation will be the real test for bilateral relations. As progress in the areas of transport and culture may seem promising, according to the experts from the Polish Center for Eastern Studies, the agreement’s proposals in terms of the war in Ukraine fall short of Polish expectations, as the formation of which Merz previously proposed in the Bundestag, so-called contact group (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland), remained unmentioned. Other issues like the migrant crisis at the Polish-German border are still unsolved, as German authorities have been continuously turning migrants back to Poland. Therefore, words must be followed by concrete actions so that the initial declarations can move beyond gestures and enter a phase of meaningful, long-term improvement.
Nawrocki’s Victory: What’s Next for Warsaw-Berlin Relations?
On June 1, Karol Nawrocki—backed by right-wing Law and Justice— won against governing Civic Coalition’s candidate Rafał Trzaskowski in the second round of the presidential race. Yet Nawrocki’s ability to reshape German-Polish relations is minimal, as the Constitution of Poland grants power of foreign policy to the government, not the president. As a historian leading the Gdańsk WWII Museum and the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, Nawrocki may champion the question of reparations and historical issues, but without the government’s backing, his reach is limited. Even should Tusk’s cabinet encounter difficulties arising from internal frictions, the constitutional process that follows ensures it will still be the prime minister and ministry of foreign affairs —rather than the president —shaping Poland’s foreign policy.
Merz at the meeting with Selenski. Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/165930373@N06/54193317596/ - President Of Ukraine
Friedrich Merz’s chancellery – what does it mean for Ukraine?
Friedrich Merz’s chancellery marks a shift in Germany’s support for Ukraine. After the criticised reluctance of Olaf Scholz and questioned “Zeitenwende”, Merz’s coalition will appear to agree to a much stronger line on supporting Ukraine. During the election campaign, Merz stated in a television debate on 9 February, that the war „could have ended sooner if Ukraine had been supported more decisively and with less hesitation.“ Merz has expressed readiness to support defence spending and increase military aid for Ukraine. By pledging to supply Taurus missiles with a range of 500 kilometres, German chancellor has contrasted with Scholz’s reserve, stating that this would put the country strategically ahead of the situation. Merz frames Ukraine as vital for European security, advocating for an exemption from Germany’s constitutional debt brake, which limits government borrowing to 0.35% of GDP. In a press conference on 4 March ,Merz vowed that „in light of threats to our freedom and peace on our continent” he would do“whatever it takes" regarding defence. His plans to scale up Germany’s defence industry and strengthen the country’s security mark a shift away from previous reductions in defence spending, under the protection of NATO’s security umbrella.
Peace negotiations
One day after the German elections, when the third year of the Russian attack on Ukraine had come, Merz called for Kyiv’s participation in possible peace negotiations. He stressed that “now more than ever, we must put Ukraine in a position of strength.”, Merz pointed out that he attacked country must be part of these negotiations” and criticised the exclusion of Ukraine in the US-Russia bilateral peace negotiation -indicating that they are “finding common ground – over the heads of Ukraine and thus also over the heads of Europe”.
In times of ongoing Russian aggression on Ukraine, the chancellor’s moves are observed by the European public eye. Merz’s term signals a clear shift from his predecessor’s stance, as he is expected to pursue a more assertive and proactive policy toward Ukraine. This change can be observed in Merz’s readiness to provide Taurus long-range missiles to Kyiv, a move that was consistently blocked by former chancellor Olaf Scholz.
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